The Battle of the Horns of Hattin 1187

The Turning Point For The Crusader States in Outremer

By E Kt Lt Col Ian G Harper Prov Swd B

The Strategic Significance of The Battle of Hattin

The battle of Hattin in 4th July 1187 CE in present-day Israel was one of the great victories of Saladin, the Sultan of Egypt and Syria (r. 1174-1193 CE). It is also known as the Battle of the Horns of Hattin, due to the shape of the nearby extinct volcano of Kurûn Hattîn.

The army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and its Latin allies were totally crushed and, shortly after, Jerusalem, unable to defend itself, was captured too. As a direct result of the battle, Muslims once again became the eminent military power in the Holy Land, re-conquering Jerusalem and many of the other Crusader-held cities.

The defeat led to the almost total obliteration of the Crusader States in the Middle East and it would spark off what would subsequently become a largely unsuccessful Third Crusade (1189-1192).

Setting The Scene

The battle took place near the city of Tiberias in present-day Israel. The battlefield, near the town of Hittin, had as its chief geographic feature a double hill (the “Horns of Hattin”) beside a pass through the northern mountains between Tiberias and the road from Acre to the east.

The Darb al-Hawarnah road, built by the Romans, served as the main east-west passage between the Jordan fords, the Sea of Galilee and the Mediterranean coast.

Saladin, the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt, took control of Damascus in 1174 CE, Aleppo in 1183 CE, and Mayyafariqin in 1185 CE. Mosul bowed to his claim to sovereignty in 1186 CE.

The jigsaw of Ayyubid domination was almost complete, all that remained now were the small enclaves of the Crusader states who well knew of the coming storm.

Appeals for help to King Philip II of France (r. 1180-1223 CE) and King Henry II of England (r. 1154-1189 CE) fell on deaf ears, despite the offer to gift the kings sovereignty over the Crusader States. Meanwhile, on 1 May 1187 CE, Saladin’s army inflicted a serious defeat on a small Latin army at the Springs of Cresson.

It was a clear indication that heavily armoured western knights were far from being invincible.

The Political Landscape

Guy of Lusignan became king of Jerusalem in 1186, in right of marriage his wife, Sibylla of Jerusalem, after the death of her son Baldwin V.

The Kingdom of Jerusalem was politically fractured between those of the “court faction” of Guy; Sibylla, Raynald of Chatillon, Gerard of Ridefort, Grand Master of the Knights Templars. Opposing them was the “nobles’ faction”, led by Raymond III of Tripoli, who had been a regent for the child-king Baldwin V and had opposed Guy’s succession.

Raymond III of Tripoli had supported the claim of Sibylla’s half-sister Isabella and Isabella’s husband, Humphrey IV of Toron, and led the rival faction to the court party.

Open warfare between the Latins was prevented only by Humphrey of Toron swearing allegiance to Guy, which ended the power struggle of succession.

However, bitterness felt by Gerard of Ridefort towards Raymond III of Tripoli for reneging on a previous deal years before would have a decisive and devastating bearing on the strategic approach to the battle of Hattin.

Running concurrently with Court intrigue in the Holy Land was that Saladin had become vizier of Egypt in 1169 and had taken Damascus in 1174 and Aleppo in 1183. He controlled the entire southern and eastern flanks of the crusader states. He united his subjects under Sunni Islam and convinced them that he would wage holy war to push the Christian Franks from Jerusalem.

Saladin often made strategic truces with the Franks when he needed to deal with political problems in the Muslim world, and one such truce was made in 1185.

It was rumoured by the Franks that Raymond III of Tripoli had made an agreement with Saladin under which Saladin would make him King of Jerusalem in return for peace.

That rumour was echoed by Ibn al Athir, whether that was true is unclear. Raymond III was certainly reluctant to engage in battle with Saladin.

The Springs of Cresson

In 1187, Raynald of Chatillon raided a Muslim caravan while the truce with Saladin was still in place. Saladin swore that he would kill Raynald for violating the truce, and he sent his son Al-Afdal ibn Salah ad-Din and Emir Gokbori to raid the Frankish lands surrounding Acre.
On hearing of the raiding party’s presence, Gerard de Ridefort summoned his Templars and by nightfall had 90 in the field. As the Crusader contingent passed over the hills behind Nazareth, they observed an expedition of around 7000 Mamelukes water their horses in the valley below. Both The Templar Marshal and Grand Master of the Hospitallers advised retreat.

Ignoring the advice, Gerard de Ridefort and his Templars impetuously charged Al-Afdal’s forces with a substantially smaller group of around 130 Knights, including 90 Knights Templars (garrisoned at Qaqun and al-Fulah), a small contingent Knights Hospitallers (and their Grand Master, Roger de Moulins, killed by a lance to the chest) and royal Knights stationed at Nazareth, and 400 Turcopoles. Simply put, they were heavily defeated with the losses being substantial with only 4 Knights surviving (one being Gerard de Rideford) out of 150 and all Turpoloes being slaughtered. The significance of the loss of the Templars on that day cannot be underestimated as they made up a great part of the military of Jerusalem. This now set the scene for the battle that would take place two months later at Hattin. Jonathan Phillips states that “the damage to Frankish morale and the scale of the losses should not be underestimated in contributing towards the defeat at Hattin”.

In July, Saladin laid siege to Tiberias, where Raymond Ill’s wife, Eschiva, was trapped. In spite of that, Raymond argued that Guy should not engage Saladin in battle and that Saladin could not hold Tiberias because his troops would not stand to be away from their families for so long. The Knights Hospitaller also advised Guy not to provoke Saladin.
Gerard de Ridefort advised Guy to advance against Saladin, and Guy took his advice. Norman Housley suggests that that was because “the minds of both men had been so poisoned by the political conflict 1180-87 that they could only see Raymond’s advice as designed to bring them personal ruin” and also because he had spent Henry II of England’s donations in calling the army and was reluctant to disband it without a battle. That was a gamble on Guy’s part, as he had left only a few knights to defend the city of Jerusalem.

The Balance of Forces
- Franks Versus Moor

Saladin’s army was composed of his own elite bodyguards (the Mamluks, who were mostly of Turkish-Kurdish origin and trained since boys), mercenaries (typically mounted archers), those troops conscripted from Ayyubid lands, and even some volunteers eager for adventure and a religious war. Over several months the army was mustered at a point south of Damascus under the supervision of Saladin’s eldest son al-Afdal.
At Hattin, Saladin was able to field around 12,000 mercenaries and 6,000-12,000 conscripted troops; 12,000 of whom were regular cavalry. The whole army was organised into three divisions, with Saladin commanding the centre in bastion.

The Latin army was led by the king oft he Kingdom of Jerusalem, Guy of Lusignan (r. 1186-1192 CE). The Franks had around 15,000 to 18,000 infantry, 500 Turcopoles and around 1,300 mounted knights. Almost every able-bodied Frank from the Crusader States had been called up and additional mercenaries bought using the annual money King Henry II of England sent to the Holy Land towards its defence. Although large it was not as numerous as Saladin’s. Crucially, the cities and castles of the Crusader States had been stripped of their garrisons in order to assemble under Cross. This venture was very high risk, if the Latin field army lost, so too would Outremer.

Battle - The Horns of Hattin

On 3 July 1187 CE Saladin attacked the moving Frankish army as it marched from its base at Sapphorie towards Tiberias, which was then under siege from Saladin’s army, now considered a deliberate attempt to coax the Franks into mobilising. The wife of Raymond of Tripoli was stuck in the besieged citadel of Tiberias, and this may have been the deciding factor in the Franks’ mobilisation.

Significantly, the Franks would have to travel through the waterless hills of Galilee. Saladin’s primary strategy was to have his mounted archers continuously harass the enemy and then quickly retreat. The 12th-century CE historian Imad ad-Din al-lsfahani recorded, “the arrows plunged into them, transforming their lions into hedgehogs”.

Eventually, the lines of the Latin army became far too stretched out with the Knight Templars at the rear facing the fiercest attacks, but at nightfall, the army managed to make camp. The Muslim army followed suit, but they had the distinct advantage of being able to bring supplies by camel from Lake Tiberias, especially water.

On the morning of 4 July, the Franks attempted to push on to the lake, which should have been within easy reach being only 10 kilometres away. Saladin responded by having his men set fires in the surrounding bush, the heat and smoke thus only adding to the westerners’ thirst. When the heat reached its maximum at midday, Saladin’s archers, each equipped with 400 arrows, were ordered to let loose a devastating bombardment on the enemy.

In the resulting confusion, the Frankish infantry scattered, abandoning their usual protective position around the cavalry.

One group, led by Raymond of Tripoli, broke through the encircling Muslims and escaped, although later it would be suggested that they had been permitted to leave by prior agreement, such were the treacherous rivalries, mistrust, and squabbling between the Latin nobles.

The general disorder that fateful day was referred to in a contemporary letter sent to the Master of the Knights Hospitaller in Italy. The Franks’s discipline had not been as good as it could have been, with many of the western warriors not following in support when the Knights Templars charged the enemy. As a consequence, the Templars found themselves isolated, surrounded and ultimately massacred.

The remaining Franks rallied on the slopes of the twin peaks of Mt. Hattin also called the Horns of Hattin. A name of infamy which the battle has become associated with. The location did offer some meagre protection thanks to a number of ruined Iron Age walls, however, by now the result was inevitable.

Two last and desperate charges directly aimed at Saladin and his bodyguard failed, and the Muslims closed in for victory.

One strategy the Muslim army had used to great effect was to attack the horses of the western knights, whose armour made them almost invulnerable, thus reducing their mobility and permitting their capture. As the 13th-century CE Arab historian Abu Shama states:

A Frankish knight, as long as his horse was in good condition, could not be knocked down. Covered with mail from head to foot, which made him look like a block of iron, the most violent blows make no impression on him. But once his horse was killed, the knight was thrown and taken prisoner. Consequently, though we counted them (Frankish prisoners) by the thousand, there were no horse amongst the spoils whereas the knights were unhurt,

(quoted in Nicolle, 45)

Guy de Lusignan was captured but treated hospitably and later released, while Reynard of Chatillon, who had earlier attacked a Muslim caravan in contravention of a truce, got his comeuppance and was mercilessly butchered, the first blow coming from Saladin’s own scimitar. Most of the other captured Frankish nobles were set free after the payment of a ransom, but the commoners were sold into slavery. In contrast, according to the Arab historian Ibn al-Athir (d. c. 1233 CE), any captured brothers of the Knights Hospitaller and Knights Templar were summarily executed as Saladin feared their fighting skills and devotion to the Christian cause. The Master of the Templars, Gerard de Ridefort, was spared for ransom. The Order itself having lost some 230 of its experienced leaders and knights based in the Holy Land was tectonic in nature bringing the Order to its knees and leaving most its castles, and the defences in Holy Land, highly vulnerable.

Those Templars and Hospitallers who were captured were summarily executed by beheading on the express orders of Saladin based on his assessment of their ideological commitment and strategic importance within Outremer. Without the Orders, the precarious Latin settlements would not survive for long.

Saladin, besides winning a famous victory secured the added bonus of capturing the True Cross holy relic, captured from Guy’s royal tent after the battle. The loss of such a precious spiritual talisman was a mortal blow to the Franks and Western Europe in general. Saladin celebrated the success at Hattin by erecting a domed building at the site, the foundations of which are still visible today.

Aftermath

The aftermath of the defeat at Hattin saw the Crusader Kingdom crumble alarmingly. Hattin had hollowed out the Kingdom’s defensive infrastructure, with castles left essentially ungarrisoned as troops having flocked to the cross. Thirty falling within a couple of months.
Saladin followed up his victory at Hattin by quickly retaking key cities such as Acre, Tiberias, Caesarea, Nazareth, Jaffa and even, the holiest of holies itself, Jerusalem on 2 October 1187 CE. Saladin accepted ransoms from those Latin Christians who could afford to buy their freedom and enslaved the rest.

The later causing a near-crash in the Middle East’s slave market. Eastern Christians were permitted to remain in Jerusalem as a protected minority group. The Latin East had all but collapsed, only Tyre remained in Christian hands under the command of Conrad of Montferrat, as well as a handful of castles including Krak des Chevaliers, which would prove to be pivotal for the coming fightback.

The West responded to the loss at Hattin and the immediate fall of Jerusalem by organising the Third Crusade. One of the largest of the crusade campaigns, it would be led by three European monarchs, hence its other name of ‘the Kings’ Crusade’. The three leaders were: Frederick I Barbarossa, King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1152-1190 CE), Philip II of France, and Richard I ‘the Lionhearted’ of England (r. 1189-1199 CE). Despite some minor victories and the recapture of Acre, the West could not wrest Jerusalem from Saladin whose Ayyubid dynasty would continue to rule until 1250 CE in Egypt and 1260 CE in Syria.

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